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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Appellee Francis X. Dougherty, a former employee 
with the School District of Philadelphia, was terminated after 
publicly disclosing the alleged misconduct of the School 
District’s Superintendent in steering a prime contract to a 
minority-owned business.  Dougherty filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the 
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law.  Appellants challenge the 
District Court’s denial of their motions for summary 
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.  We will affirm. 
 
I. 
A. 
Francis X. Dougherty previously served as the Deputy 
Chief Business Officer for Operations and Acting Chief of 
Operations for the Office of the Deputy Superintendent 
within the School District of Philadelphia.  In this role, 
Dougherty was accountable for the School District’s 
operational departments, including the Office of Capital 
Programs (“OCP”).  OCP developed projects and solicited 
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bids for all capital works within the School District, subject to 
the School Reform Commission’s (“SRC”) approval.  
Dougherty reported to Deputy Superintendent Dr. Leroy 
Nunery, who in turn reported to Superintendent Dr. Arlene 
Ackerman.  
 On September 2, 2010, Dr. Ackerman directed OCP to 
install new security cameras across the School District’s 
nineteen “persistently dangerous” schools.  Dougherty was 
instructed to lead the procurement process, which was to be 
completed within 30 to 60 days.  Due to the short time frame, 
OCP could not utilize its usual competitive bidding process.  
Therefore, pursuant to School District policy, OCP was 
required to select a pre-qualified contractor, i.e., a contractor 
with an existing contract with the School District or another 
state agency that was obtained through a competitive bid.  
Dougherty and his team identified Security and Data 
Technologies, Inc. (“SDT”) as one such contractor.   
 After Dougherty’s team prepared a proposal and drew 
up an implementation plan with SDT for the camera project, 
Dougherty submitted a completed resolution to Dr. Nunery 
for review.  Pursuant to School District policy, the 
Superintendent is required to approve the resolution before it 
is presented to the SRC for consideration and final approval.  
In this instance, Dougherty did not receive a response from 
either Dr. Nunery or Dr. Ackerman, nor was the resolution 
presented to the SRC at its next meeting. 
 Rather, on September 23, 2010, Dr. Ackerman 
convened a meeting with Dougherty, Dr. Nunery, and several 
other operations employees.  Dr. Ackerman allegedly rejected 
the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation and 
directed that IBS Communications, Inc. (“IBS”), a minority-
owned firm, be awarded the prime contract instead.  IBS was 
not a pre-qualified contractor and was therefore ineligible for 
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no-bid contracts.  However, Dr. Ackerman submitted IBS’s 
implementation plan to the SRC for review at its October 13 
meeting, and the SRC ratified the plan at its voting meeting 
on October 20.  
 At the September 23 meeting, Dr. Ackerman also 
transferred management responsibility for the camera project 
to the School District’s Procurement Director, whose 
department did not ordinarily handle this type of project.  
Subsequently, Dougherty was not included in a camera 
project personnel meeting called by Dr. Nunery in November 
2010 to discuss a complaint made by IBS.  Dr. Nunery 
criticized the staff and blamed Dougherty for obstructing 
IBS’s work.  An upset Dougherty sent Dr. Nunery an email 
rejecting his allegations and requesting to discuss the issue.  
On November 10, 2010, Dougherty met with reporters 
from The Philadelphia Inquirer concerning Dr. Ackerman’s 
alleged wrongdoing in connection with the IBS contract.  On 
November 28, The Philadelphia Inquirer published an article 
headlined, “Ackerman Steered Work, Sources Say.”  App. 
208-11.   It was the first of several articles accusing Dr. 
Ackerman of steering the contract to IBS in violation of state 
guidelines and School District policies and procedures.  
Dougherty also submitted a report to the FBI Tips and Public 
Leads website, contacted several state representatives, and 
submitted a hotline report to the Office of Inspector General 
for the U.S. Department of Education. 
The day after The Philadelphia Inquirer article was 
published, Dougherty was called to a meeting with Dr. 
Ackerman and Dr. Nunery.  Dr. Ackerman vowed to get to 
the bottom of who leaked the information and stated she 
could fire Dougherty over this information getting to the 
press.  On December 13, Dr. Ackerman and her direct reports 
decided a full-blown investigation was needed, and, in an 
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effort initiated by Dr. Ackerman, placed Dougherty and five 
others on administrative leave pending the investigation.  
When Estelle Matthews, the School District’s senior-most 
human resources executive, suspended Dougherty, Dougherty 
told Matthews that he was in fact the leak and had already 
gone to federal law enforcement agencies. 
Several days later, Dr. Ackerman hired Michael 
Schwartz of Pepper Hamilton LLP (“Pepper Hamilton”) to 
conduct the investigation.  There is a significant factual 
dispute as to the nature of the investigation.  Dougherty 
contends that Dr. Ackerman specifically instructed Schwartz 
to find the source of the leak.  Schwartz maintains, however, 
that the scope of the investigation was limited to discovering 
“[a]ll of the facts surrounding the decision to award these 
contracts . . . [and] whether anyone at the School District had 
violated School District policies or Pennsylvania or federal 
[laws].”  App. 14 (first alternation in original).  The relevant 
confidentiality provision of the School District’s Code of 
Ethics provides:  “A School District employee shall not 
disclose confidential information concerning property, 
personnel matters, or affairs of the [School] District or its 
employees, without proper authorization . . . . Nothing in this 
provision shall be interpreted as prohibiting the practice of 
‘whistle-blowing.’”  App. 192.   
In March 2011, Pepper Hamilton issued its report, 
concluding that there was no evidence of unlawful motive in 
the award of the IBS contract.  Pepper Hamilton did find, 
however, that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics by 
emailing information about the SDT proposal to an unknown 
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email address1 before the September 23 meeting.  The 
investigation also revealed that Dougherty emailed large 
volumes of confidential information related to the camera 
project to his personal email address—which is not a 
violation of the Code of Ethics per se—beginning on 
November 10.    
Following the investigation, Dougherty was notified 
that the School District was recommending his termination to 
the SRC.  It explained that Dougherty had breached (or, the 
School District alleged, attempted to breach) the 
confidentiality section of the Code of Ethics when he 
forwarded emails to an unknown email address and to his 
personal email address.  It also emphasized that Dougherty’s 
refusal to cooperate in the investigation—after he had been 
suspended and retained a lawyer—prevented the School 
District from reaching any other conclusion.  On April 27, 
2011, the SRC terminated Dougherty.  
B. 
 On February 24, 2012, Dougherty filed a complaint 
against the School District of Philadelphia, Dr. Ackerman, 
Dr. Nunery, Matthews, the SRC, and four individual SRC 
members2 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  He 
claimed that Appellants terminated him in retaliation for his 
disclosure of Dr. Ackerman’s alleged misconduct to The 
Philadelphia Inquirer and law enforcement agencies, in 
violation of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
                                              
1 Dougherty claims the email account is a personal 
email address, which the District Court accepted for purposes 
of summary judgment.  The Pepper Hamilton investigation 
never determined to whom the email account belonged. 
2 The claims against the SRC and the SRC members 
were dismissed. 
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Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1421, 
et seq. 
 In August 2013, the School District, Dr. Nunery, and 
Matthews filed a joint motion for summary judgment and 
asserted the defense of qualified immunity as to Dougherty’s 
First Amendment retaliation claim.  Anthony Antognoli, on 
behalf of the estate of Dr. Ackerman,3 filed a motion for 
summary judgment one month later and asserted the same 
defense.  The District Court held that the summary judgment 
record was sufficient to show a violation of a clearly 
established constitutional right, and it denied both motions in 
an order submitted September 18, 2013.  Dr. Nunery, 
Matthews, and Antognoli filed this interlocutory appeal 
challenging the denial of summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds.  The District Court further elucidated its 
order with a supplemental opinion. 
 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
Dougherty, the District Court explained that Dougherty’s 
allegations were sufficient to establish a First Amendment 
retaliation claim.  First, it found no evidence “suggesting 
[Dougherty’s speech] fell within the scope of his duties to 
recognize the alleged misconduct as such and report it,” App. 
24, and, therefore, concluded that Dougherty spoke as a 
citizen under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
Second, it found no evidence “compel[ling] a conclusion that 
Dougherty and [Appellants] had such close working 
relationships that his reports to the press would undermine 
their ability to work together,” tipping the balancing test 
established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 
                                              
3 Dr. Ackerman passed away in February 2013.  
Anthony Antognoli, the representative of her estate, was 
substituted as a defendant in August 2013.  
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(1968), in his favor.  App. 27.  Finally, the District Court 
found that Appellants’ motivation for firing Dougherty was a 
disputed issue of material fact,4 and concluded that Dougherty 
made a sufficient showing of improper motivation to put the 
issue before a jury.   
 Turning to whether the right was clearly established, 
the District Court found that a reasonable governmental 
official would have been on notice that retaliating against 
Dougherty’s speech was unlawful.  Thus, it concluded that 
Appellants were not entitled to qualified immunity.  The 
District Court stayed its proceedings pending this appeal.  
II. 
The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and this Court has jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.  
Under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order is 
immediately appealable as a “final decision” within the 
meaning of § 1291 if it “[1] conclusively determine[s] the 
disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [is] 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (first, third, and fifth alternations in 
original).  It is well established that an order denying 
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds may 
qualify as an appealable final decision under the collateral 
order doctrine.  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-
                                              
4 As the District Court explained, a reasonable jury 
could find that Appellants’ explanation for terminating 
Dougherty was pretextual:  the Code of Ethics did not 
prohibit taking work home and, regardless, made an 
exception for whistleblowing.   
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530 (1985).  However, appellate jurisdiction exists only “to 
the extent that [the order] turns on an issue of law.”  Id. at 
530. 
Accordingly, for each of Appellants’ claims, “we 
possess jurisdiction to review whether the set of facts 
identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a 
violation of a clearly established constitutional right[;]” 
however, “we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the district 
court correctly identified the set of facts that the summary 
judgment record is sufficient to prove.”  Ziccardi v. City of 
Phila., 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Monteiro v. 
City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen 
qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those 
issues must be determined by the jury.”). 
To the extent we have jurisdiction, this Court exercises 
plenary review over an appeal from a denial of summary 
judgment based on a lack of qualified immunity.  Reilly v. 
City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2008).  A court 
may grant summary judgment only when the record “shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  In determining whether there is a genuine issue 
of fact for trial, “[w]e must view the underlying facts and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion . . . .”   McGreevy v. Stroup, 
413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). 
III. 
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory 
or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time 
of the challenged conduct.”  Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 
2088, 2093 (2012).  The qualified immunity analysis is a two-
step process, which a court may address in either order 
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according to its discretion.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 236 (2009).  Here, we first decide whether the facts, 
taken in the light most favorable to Dougherty, establish that 
the Appellants’ conduct “violated a constitutional right.”  
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  Second, we 
determine whether that right was “clearly established” at the 
time of the challenged conduct.  Id.   
A. 
Under the first prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis, we must decide whether a constitutional violation—
here, First Amendment retaliation—was established based on 
the facts identified by the District Court.  “[A] State may not 
discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that 
employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of 
speech.”  Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987).  
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public 
employee must show that (1) his speech is protected by the 
First Amendment and (2) the speech was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action, which, if 
both are proved, shifts the burden to the employer to prove 
that (3) the same action would have been taken even if the 
speech had not occurred.  See Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 
179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009).  
We need not reach the second and third elements of 
Dougherty’s First Amendment retaliation claim, which 
present questions of fact and are not contested in this appeal.  
The District Court concluded that Dougherty adduced 
sufficient evidence to present these questions to a jury, and 
we do not have jurisdiction to review that conclusion under 
the collateral order doctrine.  See Reilly, 532 F.3d at 232-33; 
Monteiro, 436 F.3d at 405.   
Rather, central to the question presented here, we 
focus on whether the set of facts identified by the District 
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Court establishes that Dougherty’s speech is entitled to 
protection by the First Amendment.  This is a question of law, 
appropriate for appellate review.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 148 n.7 (1983). 
As the Supreme Court has reiterated time and time 
again, “free and unhindered debate on matters of public 
importance” is “the core value of the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment.”  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.  
Accordingly, “public employees do not surrender all their 
First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”  
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417.  At the same time, the Supreme 
Court also aptly recognizes the government’s countervailing 
interest—as an employer—in maintaining control over their 
employees’ words and actions for the proper performance of 
the workplace.  See id. at 418-19.  Thus, “[s]o long as 
employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public 
concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are 
necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and 
effectively.”  Id. at 419. 
With this backdrop, we conduct a three-step inquiry to 
determine whether a public employee’s speech is protected:  
first, the employee must speak as a citizen, not as an 
employee, under the test established in Garcetti and recently 
reiterated by the Supreme Court in Lane v. Franks, __ U.S. 
__, __, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378-80 (2014); second, the speech 
must involve a matter of public concern, which is here 
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undisputed;5 and third, the government must lack an 
“adequate justification” for treating the employee differently 
than the general public based on its needs as an employer 
under the Pickering balancing test.  Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We address the Garcetti 
and Pickering inquiries in turn. 
1 
i. 
Garcetti establishes that when public employees speak 
“pursuant to their official duties,” that speech does not 
receive First Amendment protection.  547 U.S. at 421.  This is 
because, when doing so, “employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”  Id.  The rationale underlying this distinction 
“promote[s] the individual and societal interests that are 
served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public 
concern,” while “respect[ing] the needs of government 
                                              
5 Speech involves a matter of public concern when, 
considering the “content, form, and context of a given 
statement,” it can “be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community.”  Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 147-48.  As we have 
long recognized, “[d]isclosing corruption, fraud, and illegality 
in a government agency is a matter of significant public 
concern.”  Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 829 
(3d Cir. 1994).  The District Court and the parties agree that 
Dougherty’s report to The Philadelphia Inquirer exposing the 
School District’s alleged impropriety in the award of the IBS 
contract implicates a matter of public concern.  We also agree 
and need not belabor the point here.  
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employers attempting to perform their important public 
functions.”  Id. at 420.   
In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s 
internal memorandum advising his supervisors of the 
disposition of a pending case was speech made pursuant to 
his official duties.  Id. at 420-21.  It reasoned that writing the 
memo was part of the prosecutor’s “daily professional 
activities” as a government employee, distinguishable from 
“the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work 
for the government.”  Id. at 422, 423.  Finding that the 
prosecutor did not speak as a citizen, therefore, “simply 
reflect[ed] the exercise of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or created.”  Id. at 422.  
The Garcetti Court explicitly declined to advance a 
framework for defining when an employee speaks pursuant to 
his official duties, explaining that “[t]he proper inquiry is a 
practical one.”  Id. at 424.  This reflects “the enormous 
variety of fact situations” in which a public employee claims 
First Amendment protection.  Id. at 418 (quoting Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 569).   
This Court has given contours to Garcetti’s practical 
inquiry for defining the scope of an employee’s duties.  We 
declined to extend First Amendment protection to speech 
where public employees were required to take the speech “up 
the chain of command,” Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 
241-43 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that police officers’ 
statements concerning hazardous conditions at a firing range 
were made within their official duties since they were 
obligated to report that type of information up the chain of 
command), abrogated on other grounds by Borough of 
Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011), and where an 
employee’s technically-off-duty speech related to “special 
knowledge” or “experience” acquired through his de facto job 
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duties, Gorum, 561 F.3d at 185-86 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (holding that a professor’s speech at a student’s 
disciplinary hearing was made within his official duties since 
the professor had special knowledge and experience with the 
university’s disciplinary code as a de facto advisor to students 
with disciplinary issues).  “[W]hether a particular incident of 
speech is made within a particular plaintiff’s job duties is a 
mixed question of fact and law.”  Foraker, 501 F.3d at 240. 
Applying Garcetti’s test to the facts the District Court 
identified in the light most favorable to Dougherty, we agree 
that Dougherty did not speak “pursuant to his official duties” 
when he disclosed details of Dr. Ackerman’s alleged 
misconduct in awarding the prime contract to IBS.  The 
District Court found no evidence that Dougherty’s 
communication with The Philadelphia Inquirer fell within the 
scope of his routine job responsibilities at the School District.  
Unlike the employees in Garcetti, Foraker, and Gorum, 
“nothing about Dougherty’s position compelled or called for 
him to provide or report this information,” whether to the 
School District, the press, or any other source.  App. 24.  To 
the contrary, the School District appears to discourage such 
speech through its Code of Ethics’ confidentiality provision, 
which is being used to justify Dougherty’s termination in the 
instant case.  Dougherty’s report to The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, therefore, was made as a citizen for First 
Amendment purposes and should not be foreclosed from 
constitutional protection.  
Faced with the District Court’s application of Garcetti, 
and precluded from challenging the factual sufficiency of the 
summary judgment record, see Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 61, 63, 
Appellants instead allege that the District Court failed to use 
the proper legal standard.  They replace Garcetti’s “pursuant 
to official duties” test with one that precludes First 
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Amendment protection for speech that “owes its existence to 
a public employee’s professional responsibilities.”  See 
Appellants’ Br. at 15 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22).  
After plucking Garcetti’s language to canonize a new 
standard, Appellants rely on Gorum to argue that, because the 
content of Dougherty’s speech was gained from “special 
knowledge” and “experience” with the camera project 
entrusted to Dougherty, his speech “owes its existence to” his 
professional duties.   
These arguments ask us to read Garcetti far too 
broadly.  This Court has never applied the “owes its existence 
to” test that Appellants wish to advance, and for good reason: 
this nearly all-inclusive standard would eviscerate citizen 
speech by public employees simply because they learned the 
information in the course of their employment, which is at 
odds with the delicate balancing and policy rationales 
underlying Garcetti.   
To this end, it bears emphasis that whether an 
employee’s speech “concern[s] the subject matter of [his] 
employment” is “nondispositive” under Garcetti.  547 U.S. at 
421.  This is because the First Amendment necessarily 
“protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.”  Id.  
In fact, as the Supreme Court recently reiterated, speech by 
public employees “holds special value precisely because 
those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern 
through their employment.”  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 
(emphasis added); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 
77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) (observing, in the public concern 
context, that public employees are “uniquely qualified to 
comment” on “matters concerning government policies that 
are of interest to the public at large”); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
572 (“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community 
most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how 
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funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent.  
Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out 
freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory 
dismissal.”).  
Moreover, Appellants misread Gorum’s holding.  We 
reemphasized in Gorum that Garcetti’s “pursuant to official 
duties” test requires a practical inquiry.  561 F.3d at 185; see 
also Foraker, 501 F.3d at 240 (describing the nature of the 
practical inquiry as “fact-intensive”).  We concluded that, 
although advising at disciplinary hearings was not listed in 
the professor’s formal job description, his extensive 
knowledge and experience with disciplinary actions as a de 
facto disciplinary advisor rendered that speech within his job 
duties nonetheless.  Gorum, 561 F.3d at 186; cf. Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 425 (“[L]isting of a given task in an employee’s 
written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of 
the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment 
purposes.”).  Accordingly, Appellants’ attempt to preclude 
First Amendment protection from Dougherty’s report—a duty 
absent from both his de facto and de jure responsibilities—is 
inapt.   
ii. 
In addition, taking this opportunity to respond to the 
parties’ differing interpretations of the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Lane, we conclude that Lane reinforces 
Garcetti’s holding that a public employee may speak as a 
citizen even if his speech involves the subject matter of his 
employment. 
In Lane, the Supreme Court held that truthful sworn 
testimony, compelled by subpoena and made outside the 
scope of the employee’s “ordinary job responsibilities,” is 
protected under the First Amendment.  134 S. Ct. at 2378.  
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Edward Lane, a program director at a community college, 
was terminated after he was compelled to testify about a 
former employee’s misuse of state funds that he discovered in 
the course of a financial audit.  Id. at 2375-76.  The Eleventh 
Circuit held that Lane acted pursuant to his official duties 
when he investigated and reported the fraud, and, therefore, 
concluded that his testimony “owe[d] its existence to” his 
official responsibilities, foreclosing First Amendment 
protection.  Id. at 2376-77 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed this 
conclusion.6  It reasoned, like we do, that the Eleventh Circuit 
“read Garcetti far too broadly” by ignoring Garcetti’s explicit 
qualification “that its holding did not turn on the fact that the 
memo at issue ‘concerned the subject matter of [the 
prosecutor’s] employment.’”  Id. at 2379 (alternation in 
original) (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).  After analyzing 
Garcetti, the Court emphasized:  “[T]he mere fact that a 
citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of 
his public employment does not transform that speech into 
employee—rather than citizen—speech.”  Id.  Rather, “[t]he 
critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue 
is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, 
not whether it merely concerns those duties.”  Id.  Thus, Lane 
rejects the very contention Appellants advance.   
 While Lane focused on speech in the context of 
compelled testimony, see id. at 2378-79, Appellants’ 
argument that its holding is limited to that context is 
misguided.  Cf. Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 294-95 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (applying Lane to a teacher’s critical emails 
                                              
6 On the second prong of the qualified immunity 
analysis, the Lane Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s 
holding that the law was not clearly established in that circuit. 
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concerning classroom conditions).  The Supreme Court’s 
focus on sworn testimony was in response to the “short shrift” 
the Eleventh Circuit gave to that speech, which presented a 
circuit split when compared to this Court’s holding in Reilly 
v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d at 231.  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 
2377, 2378.  Even after recognizing that “sworn testimony in 
this case is far removed from the speech at issue in Garcetti,” 
the Court located its rule of decision in Garcetti and applied 
the “critical question” under Garcetti to the facts in Lane.  Id. 
at 2379.  If anything, Lane may broaden Garcetti’s holding 
by including “ordinary” as a modifier to the scope of an 
employee’s job duties.  See Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 294-95 (“[T]he 
use of the adjective ‘ordinary’—which the court repeated nine 
times—could signal a narrowing of the realm of employee 
speech left unprotected by Garcetti.”).  However, that 
question is not before us today. 
 Under Lane, our determination stands that Dougherty’s 
report to The Philadelphia Inquirer was not made pursuant to 
his official job duties.  Dougherty’s claim is not foreclosed 
merely because the subject matter of the speech concerns or 
relates to those duties.  
2. 
Even though we find that Dougherty spoke as a citizen 
on a matter of public concern, his speech is protected only if 
the Pickering balancing test tilts in his favor.  Under 
Pickering, we must “balance . . . the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”  391 U.S. at 568.  The more tightly 
the First Amendment embraces the employee’s speech, the 
more vigorous a showing of disruption must be made by the 
employer.  McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 365.   
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On the employee’s side of the scale, we must consider 
the interests of both Dougherty and the public in the speech at 
issue.  See O’Donnell v. Yanchulis, 875 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  It is well established that “[s]peech involving 
government impropriety occupies the highest rung of First 
Amendment protection.”  Swineford v. Snyder Cnty., 15 F.3d 
1258, 1274 (3d Cir. 1994).  Moreover, we have often 
emphasized that “[t]he public has a significant interest in 
encouraging legitimate whistleblowing so that it may receive 
and evaluate information concerning the alleged abuses of . . . 
public officials.”  O’Donnell, 875 F.2d at 1062; see also 
Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 198 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“[T]he public’s interest in exposing potential wrongdoing by 
public employees is especially powerful.”).   
In the instant case, Dougherty’s report to The 
Philadelphia Inquirer exposing Dr. Ackerman’s alleged 
misconduct is the archetype of speech deserving the highest 
rung of First Amendment protection.  Against the public’s 
significant interest in Dougherty’s act of whistleblowing, 
therefore, Appellants “bear a truly heavy burden.”   
McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 365.   
Weighed on the other side is the government’s 
legitimate and countervailing interest, as an employer, in 
“promoting workplace efficiency and avoiding workplace 
disruption.”  Id. at 364.  While the test for disruption varies 
depending upon the nature of the speech, the factors a court 
typically considers include whether the speech “impairs 
discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a 
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which 
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the 
performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the 
regular operation of the enterprise.”  Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.   
 21 
In the paradigmatic case finding speech disruptive to a 
close working relationship, Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, this Court 
held that a First Assistant District Attorney’s publicized 
comments disputing the veracity of the District Attorney’s 
statements “completely undermined” their close working 
relationship.  546 F.2d 560, 562, 565 (3d Cir. 1976).  Because 
the First Assistant District Attorney functioned as an “alter 
ego” to the District Attorney as his direct administrative and 
policy-making subordinate, we concluded that his 
“irreparable breach of confidence” completely precluded a 
functional working relationship.  Id. at 565.  On the other 
hand, we distinguished a case where the director of a discrete 
division within the Philadelphia Police Department, who 
enjoyed neither policymaking responsibilities nor the degree 
of authority comparable to the employee in Sprague, was 
terminated by the Police Commissioner for his speech 
criticizing the department in The Philadelphia Inquirer.  
Watters v. City of Phila., 55 F.3d 886, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1995).  
Here, the District Court found that, while Dougherty 
was relatively high up in the chain of command as Deputy 
Chief Business Officer for Operations and Acting Chief of 
Operations, Dougherty’s relationship with Dr. Ackerman and 
Dr. Nunery was neither close, personal, nor confidential, and 
that Dougherty never served as an “alter ego” for either.  App. 
27-28.  Despite the breadth of his operations responsibilities, 
the District Court also found that Dougherty was not a 
policymaker, but was one of many administrators who merely 
implemented Dr. Ackerman’s policies.  App. 28.  It found 
disputed, however, “how much of the disruption [to the 
School District] was the result of the press leaks” or the result 
of Appellants’ subsequent actions—hiring Pepper Hamilton, 
suspending six administrators, and ultimately terminating 
Dougherty—to find the source of the leak.  App. 28.  Viewing 
 22 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Dougherty, the 
District Court concluded that any disruption to the School 
District was outweighed by the substantial public interest in 
exposing government misconduct, tipping the Pickering 
balancing test in Dougherty’s favor.   
Considering the facts in the same light, we must agree.  
As a preliminary matter, none of the factors this Court uses as 
a proxy for disruption are present here.  First, based on the 
District Court’s reading of the record, the evidence does not 
compel the conclusion that Dougherty’s relationship with Dr. 
Ackerman or Dr. Nunery is “the kind of close working 
relationship[] for which it can persuasively be claimed that 
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to [its] proper 
functioning.”  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.  Dougherty alleges 
that he never spoke directly to Dr. Ackerman before the 
camera project, App. 26, and, even if we assume that 
Dougherty accepted such a relationship when he was 
appointed to lead the project, he did not occupy that position 
at the time the speech was made.  Cf. Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 
199 (finding that the employee’s demotion before he spoke 
“belie[d] a comparison to the undoing of a ‘close working 
relationship’ in Sprague”).  Dougherty was not even called to 
Dr. Nunery’s meeting to discuss the camera project a few 
weeks before the disclosure.  As we stressed in Watters, 
“merely saying that the relationship will be undermined does 
not make it so.”  55 F.3d at 897-98. 
Nor was Dougherty’s speech likely to impair discipline 
by superiors or harmony among co-workers, impede the 
performance of his daily duties, or interfere with the regular 
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operation of the School District.7  We emphasize that we may 
not consider Appellants’ claims to the extent they challenge 
the factual dispute concerning the cause of the disruption to 
the School District—the speech or the retaliation.  See 
Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 61.  We agree with the District Court, 
simply, that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Dougherty’s speech would have made only a minimal 
disruption had the School District not subsequently engaged 
Pepper Hamilton, suspended six administrators, and fired 
Dougherty.  It is against this Court’s precedent to find against 
an employee where the disruption “was primarily the result, 
not of the plaintiff’s exercise of speech, but of his superiors’ 
attempts to suppress it.”  Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 
107 (3d Cir. 1983).   
Finally, while the parties do not dispute that there was 
some actual disruption to the School District, we also keep in 
mind that “it would be absurd to hold that the First 
Amendment generally authorizes corrupt officials to punish 
subordinates who blow the whistle simply because the speech 
somewhat disrupted the office.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Some disruption is almost certainly inevitable; the 
point is that Pickering is truly a balancing test.  See id.  
For summary judgment purposes, we agree with the 
District Court that Dougherty’s speech is entitled to First 
Amendment protection and, accordingly, that Dougherty has 
sufficiently established the existence of a constitutional 
violation.  
                                              
7 See Watters, 55 F.3d at 896 (holding that it is no 
longer essential to show actual disruption if the government 
shows disruption is likely).   
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B. 
Having found a violation of Dougherty’s First 
Amendment rights, the second prong of the qualified 
immunity analysis requires us to determine whether that right 
was “clearly established.”  “The relevant, dispositive inquiry 
in determining whether a right is clearly established is 
whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his 
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”  
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.  To be clearly established, the very 
action in question need not have previously been held 
unlawful.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  
Rather, the “contours of the right” must be sufficiently clear 
such that the unlawfulness of the action is apparent in light of 
pre-existing law.  Id.  Whether a right is clearly established is 
a question of law, appropriate for our review under the 
collateral order doctrine.  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528. 
Viewing the facts the District Court identified in the 
light most favorable to Dougherty, we find that the illegality 
of the Appellants’ actions was sufficiently clear in the 
situation they confronted.  Since at least 1967, “it has been 
settled that a State cannot condition public employment on a 
basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected 
interest in freedom of expression.”  Connick, 461 U.S. at 142; 
see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 383 (finding the same principle 
“clearly established”).  In the case at bar, Dougherty’s 
particular type of speech—made as a concerned citizen, 
purporting to expose the malfeasance of a government official 
with whom he has no close working relationship—is exactly 
the type of speech deserving protection under the Pickering 
and Garcetti rules of decision and our subsequent case law.  
See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566 (protecting speech by 
teacher to local newspaper criticizing the school board and 
the superintendent’s allocation of school funds); O’Donnell, 
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875 F.2d at 1060, 1061-63 (protecting speech by chief of 
police to local television station that accused township 
supervisors of various corrupt practices, legal improprieties, 
and abuses of their positions); Watters, 55 F.3d at 897-98 
(protecting speech by program manager to local newspaper 
criticizing departmental program the employee oversaw 
where dispute existed over cause of disruption); Baldassare, 
250 F.3d at 199-200 (protecting investigation into alleged 
wrongdoing of law enforcement officers where there was no 
“alter ego” relationship).  Thus, Appellants had fair notice 
that their retaliation against Dougherty’s constitutionally 
protected speech would not be shielded by qualified 
immunity. 
Appellants contend that their actions were “so close to 
the constitutional line that it was eminently reasonable for 
them to conclude they had failed to cross it,” since the case 
law puts equally heavy emphasis on the employer’s right to 
avoid disruption.  Appellants’ Br. at 27, 29.  We find this 
contention unpersuasive.  While it is true that both Garcetti 
and Pickering are fact-dependent inquiries, giving some 
leeway for termination based on disruptive speech if made 
pursuant to an employee’s job duties, we cannot conduct our 
analysis with Appellants’ desired version of the facts.  We 
must review the District Court’s analysis based on the facts it 
identified.  See Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 61.  Given the citizen-
like nature of Dougherty’s disclosure to The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, the lack of close working relationships with either 
Dr. Ackerman or Dr. Nunery, and the disputed issue of fact 
with regard to the cause of the disruption, it is sufficiently 
clear that Dougherty’s speech was protected under the First 
Amendment.  “When the balance of cognizable interests 
weighs so heavily in an employee’s favor, our cases make 
plain that the law is clearly established.”  McGreevy, 413 F.3d 
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at 367.  We conclude, therefore, that Appellants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity.  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Appellants’ motions for summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 
